It seems like every time I read an aviation safety-related research study there is a ubiquitous statistic that always grabs my attention. I am referring to the "70%-80% of airplane accidents are attributable to human error" statistic. This stat grabs my attention not because of its seemingly high estimate; in fact, it surprises me that it is unrealistically low. It might be time to start acknowledging that almost every airplane accident has a human error component. I posit that 95%-99% of airplane accidents are attributable to human error. My statistical estimate is based on facts which will be discussed shortly...

The development of Human Factors (HF) recurrent training courses can offer a few unique challenges for aviation organizations. First, the subject matter that should be covered in a recurrent course can be rather nebulous. This can be compounded by questions relating to how much time should be allocated to the course. Most regulators do not provide clear-cut guidance in these areas (whether initial or recurrent training) and thus organizations tend to be tasked with figuring these things out on their own. Second, organizations may experience difficulties assessing outcome objectives to see if the training is truly having an effect. Outcome objectives are useful for measuring the efficacy of the training as well as providing critically important information to help shape or revise future recurrent courses. To provide a foundation for the rest of this article, familiarization with a pair of popular learning models is in order...

...Unfortunately, in real-world flight operations, the decision to go-around is not always clear-cut. Four major accidents are presented below to illuminate the significance of the problem. All of these accidents have a common thread; they all involved pilots’ decisions to land in weather conditions that exceeded either the aircraft limitations, pilot limitations, or a combination of both. Although detailed information about each accident is not included, extracts from the official accident reports as to Probable Cause have been cited...

...These are but a few examples of the significance of the problem; deviations from approved procedures continue to be a leading cause of maintenance-related aircraft accidents. These unfortunate accidents are largely symptomatic of deeper, underlying problems in the aircraft maintenance domain. While it might be easy to fault each accountable AMT for "pulling the trigger" on these accidents, there are usually other antecedent variables that come into play long before the final active error. For instance, deviations may stem from factors such as time pressure, stress, fatigue or lack of resources. These factors typically do not occur in isolation but are linked together and may increase the likelihood of skipped steps, signoffs without verification, or continuing a job without the correct tools or equipment...

...Since the BAC1-11 incident there have been a number of maintenance-related accidents and incidents where AMT fatigue has been cited as a contributing factor. In this same period there has also been an exponential increase in research conducted on fatigue in aviation maintenance activities. Studies have shown that fatigue can have consequential effects on a person’s cognitive ability. Cognition refers to mental processes such as awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgment...

An informal study on deviations in aircraft maintenance procedures was conducted during a human factors training course in March of 2009. The purpose of the study was to pilot test the Maintenance Events Checklist (MEC) with a relatively small sample of aircraft maintenance technicians. The MEC is intended to capture participants’ responses to statements related to maintenance deviations. Participants consisted of aircraft maintenance technicians who worked in non-airline operations (i.e., corporate and business aviation, helicopter operators, and FBOs). Results showed that nearly 50% of the participants’ indicated they had "very rarely" deviated from the MEC content items. However, 22% indicated they had deviated "occasionally" and 5% indicated they had deviated "often." Causes and implications are discussed, which focus on organizational pressure, individual complacency, and deficiencies in aircraft maintenance documentation itself...

One of the key features of a healthy safety culture is a non-punitive error reporting system. However, employees may be not be willing to report for reasons such as fear of reprisal, embarrassment, or pernicious attitudes. This study investigated error attitudes of employees at a regional airline. The Error Orientation Questionnaire was used to collect data on eight factors which included; (a) error competence, (b) learning from errors, (c) error risk taking, (d) error strain, (e) error anticipation, (f) covering up errors, (g) error communication, and (h) thinking about errors. An additional qualitative component consisted of participants’ perceptions of why they personally committed an error on the job as well as why they believed someone they knew committed an error. A key finding of this study, from employees’ point of view, is that pressure, situation awareness, and complacency are primary factors in error causation. Implications and countermeasures are discussed...

We have certainly come a long way in human factors training for aircraft maintenance technicians. I have had the opportunity to work with organizations around the world teaching and helping to develop customized human factors programs. I have measured both quantifiable and qualifiable changes in attitudes and behaviors as a result of human factors training. That is the good news. Then there is the not so good news. I have also observed a somewhat disappointing common trend throughout many organizations---the lack of management participation in human factors courses...

An airfield maintenance truck accidentally transgresses an active runway and causes a runway incursion. Although there is no actual collision between the truck and an aircraft on short final (that is forced to go around), the event is something that the pilots, maintenance crew, and air traffic controllers will not soon forget. The cause of the transgression is due to the inability of the maintenance crew to hear the tower’s last minute hold short instructions because the volume on their radio was turned down. Even though this event was fictitious, I am sure all airport managers can identify with real, similar experiences. More on this example shortly...

On first mention, many of the managers and supervisors I speak with are supportive of the idea of an error reporting system (ERS) in their organization. The benefit of an ERS is fairly obvious; if errors are reported then fixes can be implemented and errors can be diminished or in some cases even eliminated. This in turn creates a safer working environment as well as reduced vulnerability to litigation. Yet, in light of all these benefits, many organizations have failed to adopt and support a formal ERS...

Another plane crash. Another deluge of phone calls from the media asking what caused the plane to crash. Speculation is immediately and unhesitatingly articulated by witnesses, passersby, and experts. "Lightning must have brought it down" says one. Another says, "He thought the airplane was just traveling too fast to stop." Pretty presumptuous for an eyewitness; extremely presumptuous for a non-pilot. Yet, the media, in their call to action, begin to use these very accounts as an explanation as to why the airplane crashed. Amidst rampant speculation, the media have their story; albeit lacking necessary credibility...

This paper addresses leadership, followership, and decision skills as they apply to flight crewmembers. Most pilots display a mastery of these skills. Unfortunately, there are a small number of pilots who lack these and other interpersonal skills and can become a danger to the safety of flight. Two case studies are presented where there was such a breakdown in teamwork that the environment in the cockpit became hostile, abusive, and outright dangerous. Crew resource management training addresses many of these interpersonal issues and references to FAA Advisory Circular 120-51E (Crew Resource Management Training) are included for further edification...